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This paper studies the impact of decentralization on the shadow economy. We argue that 
decentralization may decrease the size of the shadow economy mainly through two 
transmission  channels: (1) Decentralization enhancing public sector efficiency (efficiency 
effect), and (2) decentralization reducing the distance between bureaucrats and economic 
agents, which increases the probability of detection of shadow economic activities (deterrence 
effect). Using various measures  of  fiscal, political and government employment 
decentralization in a cross-section of countries, we find the deterrence effect to be of more 
importance. The deterrence effect is stronger, the lower the degree of institutional quality. 
Remarkably, we find no robust evidence of the efficiency effect. 
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Shadow economic activities are a widespread and growing phenomenon throughout the
world, and almost all societies are engaged in trying to control these activities. This is
due to eroding eects on the tax base and social security systems. A recent study by
Schneider (2007) estimates the size of the shadow economy in 2005 ranging from 7.9%
of ocial GDP in the United States to 66.4% in Georgia. On average, shadow economic
activities amount to 15% of ocial GDP in OECD countries, while the average size
in other parts of the world is around 35%. The large shadow economy in developing
countries is associated with a number of serious problems, e. g. insucient scal
capacities, which may result in poor growth performance [Besley and Persson (2010)].
However, shadow economic activities are also signicant and alarming in developed
countries. The debt crisis in Greece has indubitably shown the negative outcomes of
a large shadow economy (around 30% of ocial GDP in 2007) on tax bases and social
security systems. Spain, Portugal, and Italy also face a critical budgetary situation.
To handle such crises, governments have two options: cut expenditures or increase
revenues. While the rst option is dicult to implement, especially due to the risk of
destabilizing the social coherence, the second option requires a solid tax base which is
undermined by shadow economic activities. Under those circumstances, a large shadow
economy may evenly threaten the economic and social stability.
Facing budgetary pressure, governments are likely to search for eective instruments
controlling the shadow economy in order to increase the tax base and relax their budget
constraint. Well known eective direct policy instruments to control these activities
are law enforcement and punishment [see Schneider and Enste (2000)]. An alternative
way to deplete the shadow economy is reforming the tax and social security systems,
which could improve the dynamics of the ocial economy. A third established policy
instrument is to reduce the regulatory burden in the ocial economy, which is one of
the main causes for the migration into the shadow. Further instruments are to increase
the competence and the trust in ocial institutions, to guarantee property rights, and
to enhance the eciency of public good provision.
One potential instrument to control the shadow economy that has been widely ne-
glected in the literature is the degree of decentralization. Following Oates's the de-
centralization theorem, the transfer of powers to sub-national governments increases
public sector eciency [Oates (1972)]. Decentralized authorities are much better infor-
med regarding local needs compared to their centralized counterparts and can provide
the economically ecient quantity and quality of local public goods. The enhanced
eciency in decentralized systems increases the acceptance for state interventions as
well as the tax morale [Torgler et al. (2010)] and may, thus, decrease the size of the
2shadow economy (eciency eect). Another argument in favor of decentralization is
related to the observability of activities in the shadow economy. The closer the distance
between bureaucrats and economic agents and/or the more face to face contacts are
taking place, the higher the probability that working in the shadow economy will be
discovered and the lower the expected gains from informality [Allingham and Sandmo
(1972)]. Decentralization increases the surveillance eectiveness and should thus de-
crease the size of the shadow economy (deterrence eect). Both eects should impact
the shadow economy in a similar direction, but the relative importance of the eciency
eect compared to the deterrence eect is a priori unclear.1
The three key questions the paper aims to answer are the following: Can we empirically
identify a relationship between decentralization and the size of the shadow economy? If
so, which transmission channel { the eciency eect following Oates or the deterrence
eect following Allingham and Sandmo { has the stronger explanatory power? How do
instruments used to control the size of the shadow economy interact with each other?
For this purpose, we examine the impact of alternative measures of scal, political, and
government employment decentralization on the size of the shadow economy using a
cross-section of 73 countries. Moreover, we consider interaction eects between decen-
tralization and measures of institutional quality, which turns out to be a very important
determinant of the size of the shadow economy. We nd that both scal and political
decentralization have either only a weak or no signicant impact on the shadow eco-
nomy. Most importantly, the degree of government employment decentralization has a
robust and highly signicant negative eect. This result is in line with the theoretical
prediction, that this form of decentralization increases the probability of detection of
shadow economic activities. Thus, government employment decentralization is a use-
ful instrument for governments to control these activities. Using an interaction term
between decentralization and institutional quality shows that the marginal eect of
decentralization decreases with the degree of institutional quality. This result suggests
that government employment decentralization is a particularly useful policy instrument
in less developed countries, which often have week institutions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie
y reviews the related theoretical and
empirical literature and discusses alternative transmission channels between decentra-
lization and the shadow economy. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents
the empirical methodology, the estimation results, and robustness checks. Section 5
concludes.
1 Decentralization may also have opposite eects on the shadow economy e.g. through corruption as transmission
channel [Dreher and Schneider (2010)]. They nd a complementary relationship between corruption and the size
of the shadow economy in low income countries. However, the direction of the relationship is not unambiguous,
since Alexeev and Habodaszova (2007) nd evidence of corruption and the shadow economy to be substitutes. The
relationship between corruption and the shadow economy is beyond the scope of this paper. For recent empirical
evidence see Dreher and Schneider (2010).
32 Related literature
2.1 Established determinants of the shadow economy
Although substantial literature exists on single aspects of the shadow economy and
a comprehensive survey has been written by Schneider and Enste (2000), the subject
is still controversially debated in the literature.2 An appropriate and widely used
denition of the shadow economy is the following: the shadow economy includes all
market-based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed
from public authorities for any of the following reasons:
 to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes,
 to avoid payment of social security contributions,
 to avoid having to meet certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum
wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and
 to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing
statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms.
The literature shows that the overall tax and social security contribution burdens
are among the main causes for the existence of the shadow economy and that the
bigger the dierence between the total cost of labor in the ocial economy and the
after-tax earnings (from work), the greater the incentive is to avoid this dierence
and to work instead in the shadow economy [Schneider and Enste (2000)]. Empirical
evidence provide Kirchgaessner (1983, 1984) for Germany, Klovland (1984) for Norway
and Sweden, and Lundager and Schneider (1986) for Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.
Recent cross-country studies as e.g. Giles (1999), Schneider (2003, 2005), and Johnson
et al. (1998)) conrm these ndings.
In addition to the tax and social security contribution burden, the intensity of re-
gulations is another important determinant of the shadow economy. Labor market
regulations, such as minimum wages or dismissal protections, and labor market restric-
tions for foreigners, such as restrictions regarding the free movement of foreign workers,
reduce the freedom (of choice) for individuals engaged in the ocial economy and lead
to a substantial increase in labor costs in the ocial economy. Johnson et al. (1998)
provide empirical evidence of the in
uence of (labor) regulations on the shadow eco-
nomy. Friedman et al. (2000) reach a similar conclusion: more regulation is associated
with a larger shadow economy.
2 Literature about the "shadow", "underground", "informal", "second", "cash" or "parallel" economy is increasing and
various topics, such as how to measure it, its causes and eects on the ocial economy, and the usefulness of shadow
economy estimates for economic policy are discussed by e. g. Frey and Pommerehne (1984), Johnson et al. (1997),
Johnson et al. (1998), G erxhani (2004) and Schneider (2005).
4An increasing shadow economy can lead to reduced state revenues which in turn, re-
duces the quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and services. Ultimately,
this can lead to an increase in the tax rates for rms and individuals in the ocial
sector, quite often combined with deterioration in the quality of public goods with the
consequence of even stronger incentives to participate in the shadow economy. Johnson
et al. (1998) show that smaller shadow economies appear in countries with higher tax
revenues if achieved by lower tax rates, fewer laws and regulations, and less corruption.
Countries that are in such a good equilibrium of relatively low taxes and low regula-
tory burden usually have sizeable revenue mobilization and a (relatively) small shadow
economy. By contrast, developing and transition countries are often in a bad equili-
brium with a high tax and regulatory burden on rms, low revenue mobilization, and
a (relatively) high share of activities in the shadow economy [Johnson et al. (1998)].
That is, the provision and quality of public goods is crucial for people's decision to
work or not to work in the shadow economy.
2.2 The role of decentralization
Combining the arguments of the dierent strands of literature we identify three main
linkages between decentralization and the shadow economy.
 eciency eect
 tax morale eect
 deterrence eect
A rst linkage is the eciency eect. The main argument in favor of decentraliza-
tion is based on the decentralization theorem: the transfer of powers to sub-national
governments increases public sector eciency, thus promoting economic development
and growth [Oates (1993), Baskaran and Feld (2009)]. In decentralized economies, local
authorities are better informed about local needs and can provide the economically-
ecient quantity and quality of local public goods. Especially in an economy with
heterogeneous regions, decentralized ocials are in a better position to meet local de-
mands [Oates (1972)]. Also, the competition between dierent jurisdictions and the
mobility of individuals constrain the politicians and force them to provide policies
which are close to the majority of voters preferences [see Feld and Schneider (2010)].
The more ecient provision of public goods reduces the people's or rm's incentives to
work in the shadow economy. This argument is valid in particular if the local public
good increases the productivity of rms and if the public good is usable only in the
ocial sector [see e.g. Alexeev and Habodaszova (2007)]. Hence, we expect that a
higher degree of decentralization reduces the shadow economy, ceteris paribus.
5Closely related to the eciency argument is the tax morale eect. In decentralized
governmental systems, people`s preferences are better fullled compared to unitarian
systems. The frequent interaction between economic agents (taxpayers) and local bu-
reaucrats may induce trust and thus increases the tax morale [Dreher and Schneider
(2010)]. If local authorities have not only expenditure competence but are also elected
at the local level, they have a strong incentive to take the preferences of their elec-
torate into account [see Frey and Eichenberger (1999)]. Furthermore, the proximity
between people and local administrations enhance the transparency between tax prices
and provided public goods. The higher transparency increases the tax moral and thus
in
uences the decision to engage in shadow economic activities. Thus, a higher de-
gree of decentralization reduces ceteris paribus the shadow economy via the tax morale
eect. In this case, sub-national political autonomy should be the relevant kind of
decentralization.
A last main linkage is the deterrence eect. The decision to migrate into the shadow
economy depends on three factors. First, individuals benet because costs can be sa-
ved by avoiding tax and social security contributions and market regulations. Second,
the costs of shadow economic activities depend on the punishment when being caught
and the productivity losses because public infrastructure such as law or contract en-
forcement through the legal system is only fully usable in the ocial sector. The third
combining factor is the probability of detection [see Becker (1968) and Allingham and
Sandmo (1972)]. Decentralization reduces the distance between bureaucrats and eco-
nomic agents. The higher frequency of face to face contacts increases the probability
of detection3 and, therefore, lowers the expected net gains from activities in the sha-
dow economy. Decentralization enhances the deterrence eect and should consequently
decrease the size of the shadow economy, ceteris paribus.
2.3 Previous empirical studies
Although substantial literature on various aspects regarding the shadow economy
exists, only very few studies address the in
uence of decentralization. Alexeev and
Habodaszova (2007) analyze the eect of decentralization on the incentives of local
governments to provide local public goods. Their model allows entrepreneurs to avoid
the burden of taxation by escaping into the shadow economy. A higher share of locally
raised tax revenues, however, increases the governments' incentives to provide public
goods for ocial entrepreneurs, which cannot be fully used by entrepreneurs operating
in the shadow economy. This in turn increases the incentive to stay in the ocial eco-
nomy and decreases, ceteris paribus, the size of the shadow economy. Cross-sectional
3 Feld and Larsen (2010) using individual survey data and nd that the probability of detection has a signicant negative
eect on the probability of working in the shadow economy.
6estimations using a sample of 70 countries support the main hypothesis of the theo-
retical model. These results, however, are based solely on the share of sub-national
government revenues in total government revenues. Other kinds of decentralization are
not considered.
Torgler et al. (2010) take the tax compliance puzzle, i.e., an excessively high degree
of observed tax compliance in relation to the level of deterrence, as motivation for an
empirical investigation of the relationship between decentralization and tax morale/the
shadow economy. The eect of decentralization on tax morale is analyzed using indi-
vidual data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) of Switzerland.
In order to complement the micro approach, Torgler et al. (2010) also look at the
relationship between decentralization and the shadow economy using Swiss data on
the cantonal level. They nd that a higher degree of decentralization { measured by
the share of local expenditures in cantonal expenditures { leads to more cooperation of
people with society rules, e.g. tax morale increases and the size of the shadow economy
decreases with decentralization.
Teobaldelli (2011) analyzes public policies in terms of tax setting and public good
provision in a model of a unitary country and compares the results with a federation
consisting of a continuum of jurisdictions. She nds that the shadow economy is smaller
in federal countries, since the free movement of labor induces scal policies that are
closer to the social optimum. The results are tested based on a cross-section of up
to 73 countries, in which decentralization is measured by the share of sub-national
government expenditures in total government expenditures, a federal dummy variable
and a measure of local autonomy. All considered decentralization measures turn out
to decrease the size of the shadow economy. However, the paper does not control
for current GDP levels which is an important determinant of the size of the shadow
economy. Neglecting this issue might cause biased estimates and explain the dierences
to our analysis.
We improve the existing studies in several dimensions. First, we consider the particular
federal design of countries which may have an in
uence on the relationship between
decentralization and the size of the shadow economy. Using measures of scal, political,
and government employment decentralization we are able to identify which transmis-
sion channel {the eciency eect or the deterrence eect{ has the stronger explanatory
power. Second, a major problem is that existing results may suer from an endogeneity
bias, since the degree of decentralization may also depend on the size of the shadow
economy. A decentralized government structure imposes higher administrative costs
on the society, which is an important issue especially in developing countries [Tanzi
(1996)]. A larger shadow economy erodes the tax bases, reduces government revenues,
and, consequently, limits the scope to decentralize governmental authorities. Further-
7more, also other important determinants of the size of the shadow economy may be
endogenous such as e. g. the quality of institutions [see Friedman et al. (2000) for de-
tails]. To deal with the endogeneity problem we use a instrumental variable approach.
In the two-stage estimations we instrument for both decentralization and institutional
quality. Third, since the institutional quality and decentralization may be crucial deter-
minants for the size of the shadow economy, an interaction of this variables should also
be considered. This allows us to discern if decentralization and institutional quality
are complementary of substitutive instruments to tackle the shadow economy.
3 The data
3.1 Measuring the shadow economy
Estimations of the size of the shadow economies have been undertaken since the late
1980s starting with the works of Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), Johnson et al.
(1997), and Lack o (2000). These initial studies use the physical input electricity me-
thod. Schneider (2007) uses a combination of the MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple
Causes) model and the currency demand approach. He estimates the size and trend
of the shadow economies in 145 countries around the world over the period 1999 to
2005.4 In developing countries, the shadow economy reached a remarkably large size
of an average value of 36.7% of ocial GDP in 2005. In the Eastern European and
Central Asian (mostly former transition) countries it was even larger with an average
of 38.8% in 2005. Compared to the developing and transition countries, the size of
the shadow economies in the high income OECD countries is much smaller. It was
on average 14.8% of ocial GDP in 2005. Moreover, while the shadow economies in
developing and transition countries increased in size over time, the shadow economies
in the developed countries showed a downward trend. They decreased from 16.8% in
2000 to 14.8% of ocial GDP in 2005.
To our knowledge the study by Schneider (2007) is the most recent and comprehensive
one on the shadow economies around the world. For this reason, we use Schneider's
estimates to study the impact of decentralization on the shadow economy. The de-
pendent variable used in the empirical analysis is the average over the observation
period of the Schneider data set. The countries included in the sample is are listed in
table A.5 of the appendix.
4 The shadow economy is also estimated using surveys and discrepancy methods. For a detailed discussion on the
strengths and weaknesses of the dierent estimation methodologies see Schneider and Enste (2000).
83.2 Decentralization measures
Several measurement concepts for decentralization are used in the literature [see, e.g.,
Treisman (2002) and Rodden (2004)]. Our theoretical discussion has shown that the
particular federal design should matter for the nexus between decentralization and the
shadow economy. In general, decentralization is viewed as the devolution of authority
towards sub-national governments, with total government authority over society and
economy perceived as xed. Attempts to dene and measure decentralization have
mostly focused on scal authority rather than political authority. There is however
reason to believe that the political dimension of decentralization is as important as
the scal one. While scal decentralization does not necessarily improve eciency,
public goods and policies may be more eciently provided or implemented if decisions
are made at the local level. We thus consider not only scal decentralization but also
political decentralization.
The rst issue can be approximated by using measures of scal decentralization, which
can be calculated from the IMF Government Finance Statistics. Those measures in-
clude the degree of expenditure decentralization (EXPDEC) and the degree of reve-
nue decentralization (REVDEC), which relate expenditures (revenues) of sub-national
governments to total government expenditures (revenues). Both measures are com-
monly used in the empirical literature on decentralization. However, these measures
are imperfect in so far as they do not re
ect the political dimension of the underlying
decision-making process.
To capture the dimension of political decentralization, we refer to decentralization
measures provided by Daniel Treisman [see Treisman (2002) and Fan et al. (2009)].
The data set builds up on earlier work on the operationalization of federalism by
Elazar (1995) and others. A rst measure of political decentralization is a dummy
variable for those countries, which have a federal constitution (FEDERAL).5 Only 12
out of the 73 countries in our sample are classied as federal, so that the variance of
this measure is not very high. Another decentralization measure re
ects the number of
vertical government tiers (TIERS). It ranges from 1 to 6 and can be used as a proxy for
the distance of government ocials to economic agents. In the context of government
eciency it is also important to have a measure of local autonomy. For this purpose,
Treisman has created several dummy variables based on the constitutions of countries.
A sub-national legislature is said to have `residual authority' if the constitution assigns
the exclusive right to legislate on issues that are not specically assigned to one level
of government. Another measure captures the `autonomy' of a sub-national legislature
5 Several criteria have to be fullled to count as a federal country: Countries have at least two levels of government,
which share parts of the executive and legislative authority; sub-national governments have a representation in the
federal parliament (second chamber); there is a duty to obtain consent on constitutional amendments; a constitutional
jurisdiction solves disputes between organs of state; institutions foster collaboration [see Watts (2008)].
9regarding a given question, which is said to exist if the constitution reserves exclusive
decision-making power on that question. We combine both indicators to a new dummy
variable (AUTRES), which has the value one if sub-national governments has `residual
authority' or `autonomy' or both. Treisman's data also contains data on local elections,
which is also important to test eciency arguments. He denes two dummy variables
re
ecting whether elections take place at the lowest and second lowest government tier.
We combine these two variables to a new dummy re
ecting whether elections take place
at the lowest and/or second lowest tier of government (BOSEC).
In addition to the measures of scal and political decentralization, we use the share
of sub-national government employment in total civilian government employment as a
further decentralization indicator (SUBEMPL), which cannot be assigned to one of the
two categories. We refer to this kind of decentralization as government employment
decentralization. The data is provided by the International Labour Organization's
(ILO) LABORSTA database. This decentralization measure allows to test the deter-
rence argument that decentralization increases the frequency of interactions between
people/rms and bureaucrats, thereby increasing the probability of detection of acti-
vities in the shadow economy. Due to lacking data, we are not able to consider the
size of nes explicitly. However, given that the threat of country specic punishment
is set, an increase of the probability of detection increases the deterrence.
3.3 Other explanatory variables
In line with the previous empirical literature, we use a number of control variables. All
regressions include the log of per capita GDP (GDPpc) to take the level of economic de-
velopment into account.6 One of the main determinants of the shadow economy is the
tax burden. The expected correlation between the tax burden and the shadow economy
is positive. As measure for the tax burden we use the total government tax revenues in
percentage of GDP (Tax burden). For robustness test we also use the Heritage Foun-
dations measure of scal burden. The third control variable is the unemployment
rate (Unemployment). In economies with low unemployment rates, individuals have
more opportunities to earn a good salary and "extra money" in the ocial economy.
This is not the case in an economy facing a high unemployment rate and people will
try to compensate their losses of income through shadow economic activities. Whe-
ther unemployment exhibits a positive or negative relationship to the shadow economy
depends, however, on the income and the substitution eect. Income losses due to
unemployment reduce demand in both the shadow and ocial economies. A substi-
tution of ocial demand for goods and services for unocial demand takes place as
6 See Table A.1 in the appendix for details. Table A.2 provides summary statistics of all variables.
10unemployed workers turn to the shadow economy { where cheaper goods and services
make it easier to countervail utility losses. This behavior may stimulate additional
demand in the shadow economy. If the income eect exceeds the substitution eect, a
negative relationship develops. Likewise, if the substitution eect exceeds the income
eect, the relationship is positive. Moreover, the ambiguous eect of unemployment
on the shadow economy may not only be due to the countervailing forces of the income
and substitution eect but a consequence of supply side eect when the unemployed
search for jobs in the shadow economy. To capture regional dierences we add dummies
for Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), for Middle East and North Africa (MENA),
and countries that are located in Europe and Central Asia (ECA). Furthermore, we
use a measure for institutional quality (IQ). Higher institutional quality increases the
benets of people and rms operating in the ocial sector, leading to a reduction of the
shadow economy. Our measure of institutional quality is the mean value of the three
governance indicators: `government eectiveness', `control of corruption', and `rule of
law' provided by Kaufman et al. (2009). We will comment on some additional variables
when we discuss the results of specic regressions and the robustness checks.
4 Empirical analysis
Our empirical work attempts to answer three key questions: Can we empirically iden-
tify a relationship between decentralization and the size of the shadow economy? If
so, which transmission channel {the eciency eect or the deterrence eect{ has the
stronger explanatory power? How do instruments used to control the size of the shadow
economy interact with each other?
4.1 Econometric specication
Our estimation strategy is the following: As a rst step, we estimate the impact of the
control variables on the shadow economy in a cross-country data set without considering
decentralization. In the second step, we add alternative decentralization measures.
This estimation approach enables us to compare our results with previous research
on the basis of a cross-section data set covering up to 73 countries depending on the
availability of the decentralization measures and controls. The sample countries are
summarized in Table A.5. Of course, using a panel instead of a cross-section data
set would be preferable as this would allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity
between countries. Unfortunately, Schneider's estimates of the shadow economy cover
only a short time period (1999 to 2005) in which the decentralization measures show
not enough variance { if any { to estimate a xed eects model. The cross-section
11estimation equation has the form
SEi =  +
k X
j=1
k  CONTROLSk;i + 
  IQi +   DECi + i; (1)
where the dependent variable SEi re
ects the size of the shadow economy in percent
of ocial GDP in country i, CONTROLSi is a vector of k controls including the log of
per capita GDP, the tax burden, the unemployment rate, and the regional dummies.
IQi is our measure of institutional quality. The variable DECi represents one of the
dierent decentralization measures.
Estimation of equation (1) will show that institutional quality (IQ) is the most impor-
tant policy instrument for reducing the shadow economy. To investigate how institu-
tional quality and decentralization interact with each other, we estimate the following
interaction model:
SEi =  +
k X
j=1
k  CONTROLSk;i + 
  IQi +   DECi +   (IQi  DECi) + i: (2)
In addition to the variables in equation (1), the estimation now includes the interaction
term between institutional quality and the decentralization measure (IQiDEC i). It
is important to note that we have to interpret the coecients of our main variables
of interest with caution, since we are dealing with an interaction term of two conti-
nuous variables. Without interaction of variables, each coecient re
ects the marginal
impact of the corresponding independent variable on the dependent variable. With
interaction of variables, the coecient 
 () only captures the eect of institutional
quality (decentralization) on the shadow economy when decentralization (institutional
quality) is zero. The marginal impact of decentralization on the size of the shadow
economy now depends on the sign and magnitude of the coecient of the respective
decentralization measure (), the coecient of the interaction term () and the level of
institutional quality (IQi). For a detailed explanation, see section 4.2. We apply the
OLS estimation technique and, additionally, TSLS to handle problems arising from a
possible endogeneity bias.
4.2 Estimation results
In this section, we analyze the relationship between decentralization and the size of
the shadow economy. Our discussion of the alternative theoretical links in section
2 suggests that all types of decentralization, i.e., scal, political, and employment
decentralization, may play a role in the nexus between shadow economy and decentra-
lization . To investigate this interesting question we estimate equation (1) considering
12dierent decentralization measures. Furthermore, we analyze possible interaction ef-
fects between institutional quality (IQ) and the dierent decentralization measures by
estimating equation (2). We close this section with a number of robustness checks.
Checking the data set
We rst analyze our data graphically. Figure 1 shows two scatter plots with the share
of sub-national government expenditures in total government expenditures (EXPDEC)
and with the sub-national employment share as decentralization measures (SUBEMPL)
on the abscissa, respectively, and the size of the shadow economy on the ordinate. The
gures also include a trendline suggesting that the impact of decentralization and the
shadow economy is negative: the higher the degree of decentralization, the smaller the
size of the shadow economy. However, it is important to note that the average deviation
of the observations from the trend is much smaller, when the sub-national employment
share is considered as a decentralization measure. This implies that dierent measures
of decentralization have dierent explanatory power in relation to the size of the shadow










































































Sub-national share of public sector employment
Figure 1: Decentralization and shadow economy
The inspection of scatter plots is of course only the rst step. In the next step we
estimate variants of equation (1) to test our hypothesis econometrically. Table 1 present
our main results.
In column (1) we show the results for the baseline-regression without considering de-
centralization, instead we focus only on the other control variables. In line with the
previous literature, we nd a signicant positive correlation between the Tax burden
and the shadow economy. The unemployment rate and the IQ-variable are signi-
cantly negatively correlated to the shadow economy. Unexpectedly we are not able
to identify a signicant relationship between GDPpc and the shadow economy. The
Middle East and North Africa as well as the Europe and Central Asia dummies show a
13Table 1: Estimation results: decentralization and the shadow economy (OLS)
Dependent variable: shadow economic activities as percent of GDP
basis reg. | scal dec. | |||{ political dec. |||{ empl. dec.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDPpc -0.010 -1.473 -1.377 0.132 -1.809 -0.021 0.641 -1.404
(-0.01) (-0.62) (-0.61) (0.07) (-1.09) (-0.01) (0.29) (-0.60)
Tax burden 0.340* 0.642** 0.641** 0.298 0.305 0.325 0.103 -0.056
(1.79) (2.51) (2.44) (1.37) (1.61) (1.54) (0.52) (-0.21)
Unemployment -0.341* -0.400* -0.390* -0.327* -0.299* -0.382* -0.362* -0.155
(-1.81) (-1.97) (-1.93) (-1.75) (-1.81) (-1.75) (-1.76) (-0.75)
LAC-Dummy 7.583** 9.611** 9.522** 7.61** 6.30* 7.493 5.883 4.604
(2.01) (2.60) (2.57) (2.04) (1.69) (1.33) (1.39) (0.90)
MENA-Dummy -6.066 -4.001 -4.343 -6.322 -7.278 -5.603 -1.165 -3.662
(-1.00) (-0.76) (-0.83) (-1.03) (-1.21) (-0.91) (-0.25) (-0.87)
ECA-Dummy -2.374 -0.728 -0.795 -2.449 -2.813 -2.040 -3.722 -2.363
(-0.93) (-0.32) (-0.34) (-0.91) (-1.09) (-0.73) (-1.49) (-0.67)
IQ -12.12*** -11.82*** -11.70*** -11.90*** -11.29*** -11.88*** -12.64*** -9.344***















Obs. 73 63 63 73 72 65 62 51
adj.-R
2 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.61 0.70 0.69
All t-statistics reported below the coecient estimates are based on robust standard errors [see White (1980)]. Signicance
levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%-signicance-level, ** for 5% and *** for more than 1%.
negative, while the Latin America and Caribbean dummy shows a signicant positive
sign. Our baseline-regression results are in line with the previous empirical literature
on the shadow economy.
Fiscal decentralization
Columns (2) and (3) of table 1 report specications considering the scal decentra-
lization measures EXPDEC and REVDEC. Following the theoretical considerations
of section 2.2, we expect a negative sign for both coecients. Higher decentraliza-
tion should correlate with a lower shadow economy. Surprisingly, we are not able to
nd any signicant results. The coecients show a positive sign with relatively small
t-statistics. Note that the control variables show similar coecients as in the baseline-
regression. Importantly, the IQ-variable has a strong negative eect on the size of the
shadow economy.
The results suggest that scal decentralization is not an appropriate policy instrument
to reduce the shadow economy. At a rst glance, this result is contradictory to our
14theoretical considerations but may be driven by the measurement inaccuracy of the
scal decentralization measures. The disadvantage of these measures is that they do
not re
ect the political dimension of the underlying decision-making process. Even if
money is spent at the local level, it might be that the decision for the expenditures
was made by central authorities. Following the eciency and tax morale argument (see
section 2.2), scal decentralization does not necessarily lead to a more ecient provision
of local public goods and policies compared to a centralized government under those
circumstances. Unfortunately, the scal decentralization measures do not discriminate
between nancial 
ows and the political decision making process. To mitigate this
shortcoming we consider measures for political decentralization taking local autonomy
into account.
Political decentralization
As discussed above, the degree of scal decentralization is unable to re
ect the political
dimension of the devolution of powers. For this purpose, we use the previously intro-
duced measures of political decentralization. The results are presented in columns (4)
to (7) in table 1. All measures of political decentralization show negative coecients,
although only the coecient of the number of vertical government tiers is signicant
at conventional condence levels. The results for the control variables are similar to
the baseline-regression. Again, the IQ-variable has a strong negative eect on the size
of the shadow economy.
Of course, these results are not very strong in terms of statistical signicance but
nevertheless suggest a negative relationship between political decentralization and the
size of the shadow economy. Although our approach does not directly capture the
eciency enhancing eect of local autonomy on local policies and public good provision,
the negative impact of measures of political decentralization on the size of the shadow
economy indicate the validity of the eciency and tax moral eects. It seems that
economic agents in decentralized countries are more satised with the quantity and
quality of the provided public goods and thus rather willing to stay in the ocial sector.
Our cautious interpretation is: political decentralization is a useful policy instrument
to control the shadow economy.
Government employment decentralization
As a last decentralization measure we use the share of sub-national government em-
ployment in total civilian government employment (SUBEMPL). Using this decentra-
lization measure we test the deterrence eect. The estimation results are shown in
column (8) of table 1. We nd a highly signicant negative eect of the share of
sub-national government employment in total civilian government employment on the
size of the shadow economy: A higher share of employment at the sub-national le-
15vels downsizes the shadow economy. As in the other estimations, the IQ-variable has
a strong negative eect on the size of the shadow economy. The result is also sup-
ported by the estimations using the number of vertical government tiers (TIERS) as
decentralization measure, where the sign of the coecient was negative as well and
statistically signicant. On average, a higher number of government tiers implies more
government employees working at sub-national levels of government, thus increasing
the surveillance of economic agents.
This result conrms our theoretical predictions regarding the deterrence eect. The
closer the distance between economic agents and governmental authorities and the
more face to face contacts take place, the higher is the probability of detection and
the less attractive are shadow economic activities. The overall deterrence eect might
be driven by two sub-eects. First, the closer distance can lead to better information
of policymakers regarding local needs and thus to a more ecient provision of public
goods. Second, the proximity of governmental authorities to economic agents increases
the probability of detection and consequently the expected costs of shadow economic
activities making them less attractive. Since the results for measures of scal and
political decentralization are not overwhelmingly strong, we tend to lean towards the
second interpretation. However, both sub-eects cannot be separated econometrically.
Our conclusion is that government employment decentralization increases the proba-
bility of detection and that it is, therefore, an appropriate instrument to control the
shadow economy.
We perform a number of robustness checks in order to verify the deterrence eect
(see table 2). In line with the previous empirical literature, we include money supply
per capita, the degree of urbanization, the population density, the highest marginal
corporate tax rate as well as the highest marginal income tax rate.7 The identied
relationship between government employment decentralization, institutional quality,
and the shadow economy remains strong and robust, which conrms our previous
results.
7 Using the scal freedom index of the Heritage Foundation as an alternative measure of the tax burden does not change
the results. The estimated coecient of the scal freedom index is not statistically signicant.
16Table 2: Robustness test: alternative control variables
Dependent variable: shadow economic activities as percent of GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SUBEMPL -0.385*** -0.188*** -0.186*** -0.222*** -0.187*** -0.181*** -0.220*** -0.154***
(-5.58) (-3.11) (-3.02) (-3.38) (-3.16) (-3.12) (-2.91) (-2.74)
IQ -8.756*** -8.192*** -8.227*** -9.055*** -8.633*** -9.409*** -8.891***













Obs. 73 73 73 63 73 73 63 64
adj.-R2 0.28 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.59 0.59 0.63 0.69
All t-statistics reported below the coecient estimates are based on robust standard errors [see White (1980)].
Signicance levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%-signicance-level, ** for 5% and *** for more than 1%. The
number of observations depends on the covariates included in the particular specication.
Interaction eects
Conrming previous ndings [e.g. Friedman et al. (2000)]] our analysis discovers insti-
tutional quality as the most important determinant of the size of the shadow economy.
Countries with a bad institutional framework in terms of government eectiveness,
control of corruption, and rule of law face a higher share of shadow economic activities
in ocial GDP. However, the detection of shadow economic activities also plays an
important role, as the coecient of the decentralization measure SUBEMPL shows.
To derive clear policy recommendations from our analysis concerning the impact of
decentralization, it is interesting to know how these two determinants interact with
each other. In particular, the question is whether both determinants are complements
or substitutes concerning their eects on the size of the shadow economy. From a
theoretical point of view, one might argue that they are substitutes, since an intensive
surveillance may make high quality institutions redundant, and vice versa. However,
both instruments may also complement each other since high quality institutions are
necessary to bring detected people to court so that the surveillance eectiveness in-
creases with institutional quality.
To study these eects we estimate equation (2), in which our decentralization measure
(SUBEMPL) is interacted with IQ. We receive the following results concerning the
coecients of interest: 
, the coecient of the institutional quality variable, is -14.033
17(t-statistic: -3.56), , the coecient of SUBEMPL, is -0.483 (t-statistic: -2.47), and ,
the coecient of the interaction term, is 0.1067 (t-statistic: 1.62). However, we are not
particularly interested in the individual statistical signicance of either of these terms.
Instead, we want to know their joint signicance or, more precisely, the marginal eect
of decentralization on the size of the shadow economy.8 The marginal eect can be
calculated by derivation of equation (2) with respect to the decentralization variable:
@SE
@DEC
=  +   IQ: (3)
The interaction model asserts that the eect of a change in decentralization on the
shadow economy depends on the value of the conditioning variable institutional quality.
While it is possible to calculate the marginal eect using equation (2) and the results
mentioned above, it is not possible to do likewise for the standard errors. The standard




var() + IQ2  var() + 2  IQ  cov(): (4)
These standard errors are now used to calculate the condence bands around the
marginal eects. To see more precisely how the marginal eect of decentralization on
the shadow economy varies with institutional quality, this marginal eect is plotted in
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Figure 2: Marginal eect of SUBEMPL on the size of SE depending on the level of IQ
The cuto value of institutional quality, i.e., the value for which @SE=@DEC = 0, is
4.5 in the fully specied regression. Our results imply that for about 75% of countries
8 For an excellent overview on does and don'ts in interaction models see Brambor et al. (2006).
18in our sample, increased decentralization is signicantly associated with a lower shadow
economy. For the remaining countries, decentralization has no signicant eect. The
eect is stronger the lower the institutional quality measure is. The marginal eect is
statistically signicant with 90% condence up to an institutional quality index value
of roughly 3.3. Our results imply that decentralization is more eective in controlling
the size of the shadow economy in countries with weak institutions. The analysis of
interaction eects shows, that decentralization and institutional quality are substitutes.
Addressing endogeneity issues
In order to address a possible endogeneity bias in our main results we run a number
of instrumental variable (IV) regressions. A rst source of endogeneity is the possible
simultaneity between institutional quality (IQ) and the shadow economy. On the one
hand, a large shadow economy erodes the tax bases, reduces government revenues, and
thus undermines institutional quality. On the other hand, low institutional quality
increases the incentives of economic agents to migrate into the shadow. Obviously,
there is a strong relationship between institutional quality and the size of the shadow
economy and the direction of the causality is at least ambiguous. To handle this is-
sue we instrument the institutional quality variable. Following La Porta et al. (1999)
and Friedman et al. (2000) we use the legal origin of a particular country, the popu-
lation's religious denomination, and the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization as
instruments in the rst stage regressions.
The IV regression results in table A.3 in the appendix conrm our previous results.
Again, we nd no signicant eect of scal decentralization on the shadow economy, a
weak negative eect of political decentralization (TIERS), and a signicant eect of the
sub-national employment share (SUBEMPL). The magnitude of the coecients is simi-
lar to the OLS regressions. Instrumental variables are important to obtain consistent
estimates, however, weak instruments can produce meaningless results. The rst-stage
regression can test for signicance of instruments using the F-statistic which should
be larger than 10 [see Stock and Watson (2003) or Baltagi (2008)]. As the rst-stage
F-statistics in table A.3 take values between 13.5 and 23.9 (also the partial R2 of
excluded instruments is quite large), our IV-regressions do not suer from weak ins-
truments. Moreover, having more than one instrument, one should test whether the
additional instruments are valid. The p-values of the J-statistics in table A.3 show that
our estimates are overidentied and that the error term is uncorrelated with the ins-
truments. Using instruments, we can conrm our result that government employment
decentralization is an appropriate instrument to control the shadow economy.
A second source of possible endogeneity is the nexus between decentralization and the
shadow economy. In section 2.2 we have already argued that a higher degree of decen-
19tralization can reduce the size of the shadow economy via three dierent transmission
channels. However, the causality may also run in the opposite direction. Since admi-
nistrative costs are higher in decentralized countries [Tanzi (1996)], a larger shadow
economy erodes the tax bases, reduces government revenues, and, consequently, limits
the scope to decentralize governmental authorities. Thus, the shadow economy may
impede decentralization. To control for reverse causation, we use the logarithm of each
country's area in square kilometers as instrument for decentralization following e.g.
Wasylenko (1987), Arikan (2004), and La Porta et al. (1999). A suitable instrument
should aect the countries' degree of decentralization but not the size of the shadow
economy. The area of a country should not have any eect on the size of the sha-
dow economy per se and is, for this reason, often used as an instrumental variable for
decentralization in the literature.
Table A.4 in the appendix conrms our previous results regarding the impact of employ-
ment decentralization on the size of the shadow economy. Again, we nd a signicant
negative eect of the sub-national employment share (SUBEMPL). The impact of po-
litical decentralization with regard to the number of vertical government tiers TIERS)
and the shadow economy is, however, no longer signicant. Using the logarithm of a
country's area as an instrument for decentralization also conrms the result that public
employment decentralization is an appropriate policy instrument to use to reduce the
size of the shadow economy.
5 Summary and Conclusions
Shadow economic activities are a widespread phenomenon throughout the world, and
almost all societies try to control these activities. This may be due to the illegal nature
of parts of these activities, or due to the eroding eects on the tax and social security
base. Well known eective direct policy instruments to control these activities are law
enforcement and punishment or reforming the tax and social security systems. An
alternative way to deplete the shadow economy is to reduce the regulatory burden in
the ocial economy, which is one of the main causes for the migration into the shadow.
Further instruments are inter alia increasing the competence and the trust in ocial
institutions, guaranteeing property rights, and enhancing the eciency of public good
provision. One potential determinant of the shadow economy that has been widely
neglected in the literature is the degree of scal, political and employment decentrali-
zation. The theoretical considerations have shown that the impact of decentralization
on the shadow economy is ambiguous. Decentralization may decrease activities in the
shadow economy through increased eciency of public good provision or increase sha-
dow economic activities through the eect of weak institutions. Decentralization, in
20particular government employment decentralization, may also increase the deterrence
by strengthening the surveillance eectiveness and should thus decrease the size of the
shadow economy. This paper has analyzed the relationship between these dierent
kinds of decentralization and the shadow economy.
Four empirical results should be stressed. First, measures of scal decentralization are
not signicantly related to the shadow economy. This contradicts the results of parts of
the previous empirical literature. Our results suggest that scal decentralization is not
an appropriate policy instrument to reduce the shadow economy. This nding may be
driven by the measurement inaccuracy of the standard scal decentralization measures.
The disadvantage of these measures is that they do not re
ect the political dimension of
the underlying decision-making process. Therefore, we have also considered measures
of political decentralization.
The second important result is, that all measures of political decentralization show
negative coecients, although only the coecient of the number of vertical government
tiers is signicant at conventional condence levels. It seems that economic agents in
political decentralized countries are more satised with the quantity and quality of
the provided public goods and thus rather willing to stay in the ocial sector. Our
cautious interpretation is: political decentralization is an useful policy instrument to
control the size of the shadow economy.
A third result is that the share of sub-national government employment in total civilian
government employment has a signicant and highly robust negative eect on the
shadow economy. This result conrms our theoretical predictions regarding what we
call the deterrence eect of decentralization. The closer the distance between economic
agents and governmental authorities, the less attractive shadow economic activities are.
Government employment decentralization increases the probability of detection and is
therefore an appropriate instrument to control the shadow economy. Altogether, we
conclude from our analysis that the deterrence eect (higher probability of detection)
is more important when compared to the eciency eect (better provision of public
goods and policies) of decentralization in terms of statistical signicance.
Fourth, government employment decentralization is more eective in controlling the
size of the shadow economy in countries with a weak institutional quality. Institutio-
nal quality has turned out to be the most important determinant of shadow economic
activities. To check how both instruments { government employment decentralization
and institutional quality { work together, we have analyzed interaction eects. It turns
out that government employment decentralization is a useful instrument to control sha-
dow economic activities in countries with a weak institutional framework (substitutes),
while the deterrence eect is not signicant in countries with good institutions. This
21result implies that government employment decentralization may be helpful to increase
the scal capacity, particularly in developing countries.
All in all, we nd decentralization to be an important determinant of the size of the sha-
dow economy. The dierent aspects of decentralization and their interplay with other
institutional factors must be considered in policy analysis and policy recommendations.
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24Table A.1: Data sources & denitions
Variable Denition Source
SE Size of the shadow economy (legal and illegal) in % of GDP Schneider (2007)
GDPpc real GDP per capita in 2000 $ prices (Laspeyres) Worldbank (2009)
Tax burden Total government tax revenues in % of GDP IMF Government Finance
Statistics
Unemployment Unemployment rate Worldbank (2009)
IQ Mean of three governance indicators (1996): `government eective-
ness', `control of corruption', and `rule of law'
Kaufman et al. (2009)
Money pc Total cash per capita Worldbank (2009)
Urban Share of urban living population in total population Worldbank (2009)
Pop. density Population per area in square kilometers Worldbank (2009)
Corp. tax Highest marginal corporate tax rate Worldbank (2009)
Inc. tax Highest marginal income tax rate Worldbank (2009)
EXPDEC The degree of expenditure decentralization relates the sum of sub-




REVDEC The degree of revenue decentralization relates the sum of sub-




FEDERAL Dummy for countries with a federal constitution Treisman (2002) and Elazar
(1995)
TIERS Number of vertical government tiers Treisman (2002) and Fan
et al. (2009)
AUTRES Local jurisdictions have a certain amount of `autonomy' regarding a
given question, if the constitution reserves exclusive decision-making
power on that question
Treisman (2002) and Fan
et al. (2009)
BOSEC Dummy variable, which is one if a country has elections at the lowest
and/or second lowest tier of government
Treisman (2002) and Fan
et al. (2009)
SUBEMPL Share of sub-national government employment in total civilian go-
vernment employment (xxxx-yyyy)
Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997)
Table A.2: Summary statistics
Mean Maximum Minimum Std. dev. Observations
SE 31.97 68.20 8.55 14.25 73
GDPpc 11238 33865 750 9074 73
Tax burden 16.50 29.65 0.96 6.15 73
Unemployment 9.21 30.86 0.68 5.43 73
IQ 2.85 4.74 1.29 1.01 73
Money pc 1770 21425 20 4072 62
Urban 64.72 100.00 15.10 18.80 73
Pop. density 206 6279 2 737 73
Corp. tax 28.49 45.00 0.00 8.02 62
Inc. tax 34.64 59.00 0.00 11.64 61
EXPDEC 19.82 57.43 2.97 13.99 63
REVDEC 15.24 52.18 1.18 12.37 63
FEDERAL 0.19 1.00 0.00 0.40 73
TIERS 3.59 6.00 1.00 0.80 72
AUTRES 0.11 1.00 0.00 0.31 65
BOSEC 0.85 1.00 0.00 0.36 62
SUBEMPL 44.71 92.86 11.76 18.77 51
25Table A.3: Estimation results: decentralization and the shadow economy (TSLS 1)
Dependent variable: shadow economic activities as percent of GDP
base.-reg. | scal dec. | |||{ political dec. |||{ empl. dec.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDPpc -0.438 -3.311 -3.281 -0.677 -0.498 -1.267 1.506 -2.272
(-0.13) (-0.86) (-0.83) (-0.21) (-0.13) (-0.42) (0.40) (-0.62)
Tax burden 0.314 0.478 0.473 0.243 0.376 0.246 0.136 -0.096
(1.12) (0.98) (0.90) (0.73) (1.49) (0.86) (0.63) (-0.32)
Unemployment -0.313 -0.284 -0.276 -0.271 -0.387 -0.286 -0.416 -0.107
(-1.20) (-0.99) (-0.99) (-0.98) (-1.49) (-0.99) (-1.53) (-0.36)
LAC-Dummy 7.657** 9.955** 9.906** 7.762** 6.115 7.594 5.904 4.507
(1.98) (2.51) (2.48) (2.04) (1.61) (1.31) (1.40) (0.89)
MENA-Dummy -6.029 -3.954 -4.141 -6.286 -7.324 -5.514 -0.855 -4.025
(-1.00) (-0.75) (-0.78) (-1.02) (-1.20) (-0.90) (-0.18) (-0.94)
ECA-Dummy -2.177 0.374 0.354 -2.078 -3.366 -1.479 -4.026 -2.053
(-0.70) (0.10) (0.09) (-0.66) (-1.09) (-0.44) (-1.39) (-0.52)
IQ -11.51** -8.722 -8.616 -10.69** -13.10*** -10.02** -13.689*** -8.259*















Obs. 73 63 63 73 72 65 62 51
Adj.-R
2 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.67 0.61 0.70 0.69
rst stage F-stat. 23.18 18.74 18.33 21.14 22.66 19.30 23.94 13.56
part. R
2 excl. instr. 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.22 0.22
Prob(J-statistic) 0.57 0.34 0.34 0.56 0.66 0.45 0.39 0.48
The instrumented variable is GOV. Exogenous variables used as instruments: legal origin, religion, ethnic fractionalization.
All t-statistics reported below the coecient estimates are based on robust standard errors [see White (1980)]. Signicance
levels are reported as follows: * for a 10%-signicance-level, ** for 5% and *** for more than 1%.
26Table A.4: Estimation results: decentralization and the shadow economy (TSLS 2)
Dependent variable: shadow economic activities as percent of GDP
| scal dec. | ||| political dec. ||| empl. dec.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDPpc -0.653 -0.801 0.602 -1.918 0.856 -2.106
(-0.30) (-0.38) (0.29) (-1.12) (0.10) (-0.87)
Tax burden 0.430 0.397 0.160 0.297 0.127 -0.301
(1.46) (1.20) (0.57) (1.45) (0.12) (-0.85)
Unemployment -0.346 -0.369* -0.281 -0.306* -0.336 0.005
(-1.59) (-1.82) (-1.30) (-1.96) (-0.34) (0.02)
LAC-Dummy 8.357* 8.409* 7.716** 6.138 6.669 3.408
(1.92) (1.97) (2.11) (1.51) (0.20) (0.62)
MENA-Dummy -6.945 -6.428 -7.171 -7.371 -1.451 -5.565
(-1.09) (-1.05) (-1.08) (-1.21) (-0.11) (-1.38)
ECA-Dummy -0.951 -0.791 -2.699 -2.879 -3.215 -2.401
(-0.33) (-0.28) (-0.82) (-1.05) (-0.15) (-0.60)
IQ -10.54*** -10.67*** -11.17*** -11.31*** -12.55*** -6.612*













Obs. 63 63 73 72 62 51
adj.-R
2 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.68 0.70 0.63
rst stage F-statistic 14.60 6.48 3.89 5.20 1.81 4.99
partial R
2 of excl. instr. 0.27 0.27 0.16 0.28 0.01 0.11
The instrumented variable is in each case the decentralization measure. Exogenous variables used as
instruments: the log of area in square kilometers. All t-statistics reported below the coecient estimates
are based on robust standard errors [see White (1980)]. Signicance levels are reported as follows: * for a
10%-signicance-level, ** for 5% and *** for more than 1%.
Table A.5: Countries considered
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Geor-
gia, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea
(South), Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Madagascar, Mali, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Sierra Leone, Singa-
pore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom,
Uruguay, United States of America, Venezuela.
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